U.S. Special Forces Team Led by Doug Melvin, Boise Idaho
One dominant presence in Haiti throughout the struggles was the US military and the UN “blue helmet” units charged with upholding the rule of law and trying to prevent outbreaks of violence, such as that perpetrated by paramilitary thugs against individuals and groups supporting Aristide. Each department contained a US Special Forces team, led by a “Green Beret” captain.
These teams were self-contained units of about 10 soldiers including a medic, language and culture specialists, and civil affairs officers. Each team had its own Kellogg, Brown and Root backstopping support contractor, who ensured that the Special Forces team base had power, water, and other necessities. In the Nord-Ouest, the Special Forces team during my tenure was led by Captain Doug Melvin of Boise Idaho.
In addition to the US Special Forces team there was the military presence of the UN “blue helmet” unit. The UN peacekeepers, known as blue helmets for the blue helmets they were, are made up of soldiers and civilians. In the Nord-Ouest, the responsible unit was a Nepalese army battalion led By Major Ranabbatt. The Special Forces team and UN peacekeeper units are mandated to work together in determining the best way of providing security to the department. Such collaboration was critical, but often tedious given the language and cultural barriers. Though the US soldiers were all trained in French, very few of the Nepalese soldiers spoke enough English or French to allow for ample communication.
Though the soldiers I encountered were for the most part quite professional, there arose occasional incidents that found the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) team at odds with the military units. Incidents included allegations of use of unnecessary force or intimidation, as well as insensitivity to the needs or livelihood of local residents. Sometimes these matters could be resolved through a MICIVIH-brokered conversation, but occasionally MICIVIH human rights observers would report complaints or unresolved incidents to headquarters. This MICIVIH-military relationship was another delicate balance observers generally navigated with success, to the benefit of the Haitian population. Productive (but observant) collaboration between MICIVIH, the United States and International Civilian Police (CIVPOL), and US/UN military groups resulted in the best possible outcome for the Haitian people with respect to the overall safeguarding of their human rights.
At no time was this collaboration more important – or more successful – during my tenure than during the proceedings surrounding the critical Haitian presidential elections of 1995.
Human Rights Observers Collaborate to Ensure Fair Haitian Presidential Elections
Though President Aristide was not eligible for re-election, his Lavalas party was supporting candidate Rene Preval for President. There was concern leading up to the elections that it would be extremely difficult for fair elections to be held in Haiti’s climate of political distrust and the ongoing – if in the background – presence of paramilitary thugs and anti-Aristide groups.
In order to provide the best possible chance for the electoral process to be fair, all of the international assistance groups had to work in close contact with the Haitian elections authorities to plan every aspect of the upcoming elections. The Organization of American States (OAS) installed a parallel mission to MICIVIH, with the sole mission of providing impartial international observers to report and certify as to the fairness of the electoral process and the nature of any irregularities. This OAS group worked closely with the MICIVIH teams, and in fact many MICIVIH members including myself were seconded to the OAS elections observer mission for the weeks surrounding the elections.
In advance of the election, MICIVIH and OAS observers worked closely with elections officials to understand the candidates, political climate and potential problems. Human rights observers also paid special attention in the course of their routine field visits to the attitudes of individuals, groups, and candidates toward the upcoming elections. Observers also evaluated the state of elections sub-offices. Any security concerns in Haiti were reported not only to the elections officials but also, as appropriate, to CIVPOL and/or to the US or UN military units.
As the election drew nearer, the MICIVIH, OAS, CIVPOL, and military units began holding frequent joint meetings with the Department elections office in order to plan and identify each group’s role for the elections. Among the huge logistical, legitimacy, and security issues confronted were:
- Assembling and securing all ballots and polling place materials (printed by a Canadian group and distributed around the country by US military aircraft);
- Identifying polling places (in many cases private homes) and training poll-workers in very remote areas;
- Developing communications systems to allow irregularities to be identified and reported;
- Training and deployment plans for the teams of international observers who would be in Haiti only for the election itself;
- Safeguarding polling places;
- Safeguarding ballots and securing their transport back to Port-de Paix;
- Providing for the safety of candidates and their supporters.
All of these issues were addressed, and the hard work and collaboration paid off with the outcome ultimately successful as the election played out with only minor incidents and irregularities in the Nord-Ouest.
Note: In the next installment I will write some more detail on the elections. The subsequent section will be on the human rights education campaign that my team developed.
